Abstract This paper analyzes the relationship between fuzziness and bipolarity, notions which were devised to address different kinds of uncertainty: linguistic imprecision, in the former, and knowledge relevance and character or polarity, in the latter. Although different types of fuzziness and bipolarity have been defined, these relations are not always clear. This paper proposes the use of four-valued extensions to provide a formal method to rigorously define and compare the semantics and logical structure of diverse combinations of fuzziness and bipolarity types. As a result, this paper claims that these notions and their different types are independent and not semantically equivalent despite its possible formal equivalence.
Introduction
Fuzziness [39] and bipolarity [11] are two independent but complementary notions originally (and separately) devised to face the mathematical modelling of different features of natural languages and human reasoning. Though their influence (more than considerable in fields as decision theory [14, 17, 26, 29] or machine learning [19] ) has spread separately, in the last few decades both notions have started to appear together in many developments on these and other fields (see for instance [4, 6, 13, 15, 30, 31, 38] ), which comes to show its high relevance as a topic of research inside soft computing [20] and logics [36] .
However, the relationships (and differences) between fuzziness and bipolarity are not always clear. In order to introduce our point, let us remind that, on one hand, fuzziness is concerned with the imprecision inherent to natural languages: many relevant predicates (i.e. words) P, as good or young, have ill-defined boundaries, and uncertainty arises regarding whether objects x of a universe of discourse X (e.g. decision al ternatives or ages of customers) fulfil them or not.
On the other hand, bipolarity is concerned with the character (or polarity) and relevance of information: it has become clear (see [7, 25, 28] ) that human reasoning tends to analyze reality (e.g. a decision to be taken [23, 29] ) by checking separately both the positive and negative sides of the available information (e.g. an alternative could be good for certain criteria and bad for other set of criteria) in order to acquire a more expressive and relevant knowledge. Thus, reality is judged in terms of pairs of poles of reference P/Q, as false/true or good/bad, which organize and give relevance to the available information.
Moreover, different types of fuzziness [40] and bipolarity [12] have been studied and defined. While usual (type-1) fuzziness (F1) measures linguistic imprecision in a precise way (assigning a gradable but precise truth-value ( ) [0,1] P x μ ∈ to the proposition "x fulfils P", thus modelling P as a fuzzy set), type-2 fuzziness (F2) enables such an imprecision to be measured imprecisely (since it assigns a fuzzy set of the truth scale [0,1] to " " x P ∈ ).
Similarly, while type-1 bipolarity (B1) relies on the idea that negative information is just the negation or complementation of the positive one, type-2 bipolarity (B2) allows the relation between poles to be not so simple (for example bad not good ≠ Notice that, as they try to address different kinds of uncertainty, fuzziness and bipolarity seem to be not necessarily related or interlinked: in principle a B2 formalism could be either an F1 or F2 (or even crisp!) model, and an F2 framework could be associated to either a B1 or B2 setting. Nevertheless, a commonly-used instance of type-2 fuzziness, interval valued fuzzy sets (IVFS, see [18] ), actually devised as B1 objects, has been shown (see [8, 9] ) to be in certain sense equivalent to Atanassov fuzzy sets (AFS, see [1] ), which however were originally devised as F1 and B2 objects. In fact, as a consequence of this formal equivalence, a bitter dispute (see [10] and [3] ) raised between Atanassov and his followers, on one side, and an important part of the fuzzy community, on the other, about the exact meaning of AFS and their real relevance in the context of bipolarity.
The main objective of this paper is to shed some light on the relations between fuzziness and bipolarity from a different perspective, and try to lead the referred differences between Atanassov and his detractors, apparently not totally solved, to a definitive solution. For this aim, the notion of four-valued extension (that clearly resembles that of preference structure) is used in order to rigorously define and compare the semantics and underlying logical structure of each possible combination of fuzziness and bipolarity types 1 and 2. This will allow us to separate and distinguish IVFS from AFS in a practical way, and will enable us to show the independency of fuzziness and bipolarity. AFS in a practical way, and will enable us to show the independency of fuzziness and bipolarity. AFS in a practical way, and will enable us to show the independency of fuzziness and bipolarity. This paper is organized as follows: the notions of type-1 and type-2 fuzziness are revised in Section 2, and those of type-1 and type-2 bipolarity will be revised in Section 3. Four-valued extensions are introduced and applied to the four possible combinations of bipolarity and fuzziness types in Section 4. Finally, some conclusions are shed in Section 5.
Type-1 and type-fuzziness
Since the first proposal of L.A. Zadeh in the middle-sixties of the last century (see [39] ), fuzzy set theory and fuzzy logic have enabled an increasingly sophisticated mathematical treatment of the imprecision inherent to natural languages. As said above, the imprecision of a predicate P entails uncertainty about whether objects x of a universe of discourse X verify it or not. Fuzzy logic addresses this uncertainty by allowing the truth of the proposition "x verifies P" (i.e. " " x P ∈ ) to be evaluated in the interval [0,1] (rather than in the classical, binary valuation space {0,1}). Therefore, the crisp index function of P is generalized into a membership function
that specifies the degree up to which each object x verifies P. This enables objects to partially fulfil an imprecise predicate or, in other words, the semantics (or use, see [34] ) of P on X is modeled as a (type-1) fuzzy set (T1FS)
Also, in response to some criticism raised about the possibility of obtaining totally precise membership-degrees μ is allowed and, in general, higher types of fuzziness enable further imprecision to be introduced in truth degrees.
Perhaps the simplest and most used instance of type-2 fuzzy sets are intervalvalued fuzzy sets (IVFS, see [18] ), which assign to each object x and predicate P an in-
as (equally and totally) plausible values of the truth degree ( ) P x μ . Therefore, the valuation space of IVFS is the set
is, the bigger the uncertainty associated to it, where its length ( ) ( Classic logical connectives such as not, and, or can be generalized by means of different fuzzy operators. The usual negation [22] for type-1 fuzzy sets is given by
, with P ¬ =not-P. Notice also that the usual negation defined over IVFS is
Also, t-norms and t-conorms [22, 33] are usually taken as operators for conjunction and disjunction, respectively. Both connectives are related through the negation n, so . For IVFS, these operators are extended as follows:
Notice that fuzzy logic seems to underestimate the notion of negative information. If any, it assumes that the falsehood of " " x P ∈ is equal to the truth of "
, though this falsehood could be of different nature than negative information. Anyway, it is clear that fuzzy logic does not consider an extra, independent evaluation (being either a falsehood degree or a measure of negative information) together with the (precise or not) degrees
Typical applications of fuzzy logic (today more or less covered below the term soft computing [20] ) include, among others, intelligent control [24] , decision theory [14] or machine learning [19] . Type-2 FS (specially IVFS) have also found extensive application in various fields (see for example [6] ).
Type-1 and type-2 bipolarity
Although the idea of measuring independent positive and negative information has a psychological inspiration (see [25, 28] ) and has appeared separately and without a unitary label (and even not explicitly) in the scientific literature (specially that concerned with decision theory), quite recently the term bipolarity seems to have succeeded in becoming a widely accepted label for this rather general idea [11] .
Basically, bipolarity assumes the existence of a pair of reference poles P/Q, as false/true or good/bad, which provide absolute landmarks that confer information its intrinsic positive and negative character. Information having neither positive nor negative character is therefore irrelevant or neutral in terms of such references. Thus, the poles P/Q organize and give relevance to the available information, so that positive information for one of the poles is taken as against the other.
If the relation between the poles P and Q is given by the complementation, i.e.
Q not P P = =¬ (e.g. bad=not good), then a single evaluation
is enough to capture all the information that is relevant in terms of the polarity P/Q, since then ( ) ( ) 1 ( )
and therefore the negative information is just the negation of the positive one. This situation is usually referred to as type-1 bipolarity (B1, see [13] ), and let us remark that fuzzy sets (both F1 and F2) are usually assumed to belong to this category as exposed in last section.
However, if the relation between P and Q is not so simple (e.g. bad not good ≠ 
measures the degree of positive and negative information regarding " " x P ∈ . Besides, if the relation between the poles is assumed to be symmetric (though it is possible to remove this assumption, see [31] ), then
These bivariate evidences are typical of type-2 bipolarity (B2, see [13] ), and note that, as P and Q are not necessarily complementary, B2 models in principle admits 4 possible cases or epistemic states regarding an object x and the pair P/Q: Let us remark that the third and fourth cases are not possible in B1 frameworks (as fuzzy logic), in which P and Q are tightly linked through the negation. If the relationship between the poles is somehow restricted (for example, by introducing a constraint in L L + − × ), the third or the fourth case could cease to hold, but not simultaneously: if this is the case, then we are back in a B1 setting. In relation with preference modelling and decision analysis, the notion of independent positive and negative information has also appeared in, among others, cumulative prospect theory (see [21, 37] ), outranking concordance-discordance ELECTRE methods (see [32] ), Atanassov intuitionistic fuzzy sets (AFS, see [1] ) and, more recently, in DDT logic [35] . Current applications of type-2 bipolarity along with fuzzy logic are promising and increasing (see [15, 29, 30, 38] )
It is interesting to examine in more detail the case of AFS, which assign to " " x P ∈ both a degree of membership ( ) P x μ and an independent degree of non-
is the valuation space of AFS, and notice that the same scale
is used for both evaluations (though a constraint has been included). Note also that Atanassov implicitly treats a B1 framework (i.e. in which the relevant polarity is / P P ¬ ) as a B2 one, assuming that the truth of " " x P ∉ can not be obtained from that of " " x P ∈ , thus requiring an independent evaluation ( ) ( )
As it is ( ) ( ) 1
is assumed that the disjunction of P and its negation (in terms of the Lukasiewicz t-conorm) could not be a tautology, thus violating the law of the excluded middle ( ) P P ∨¬ , that was Atanassov's aim as he wanted its model to be intuitionistic.
However, other fuzzy structures also violate such a law without considering an independent negation (for example, by taking the maximum t-conorm ∨ and ( ) 1 ( )
). Thus, the exact meaning of AFS is rather obscure, showing the semantics of a B1 framework while formally seeming to be a B2 one. Moreover, as Atanassov and his followers failed to give a clear definition of AFS's underlying logical and semantical structure (see [27] ), no solid reasons to separate AFS from IVFS were available when both formalisms were proven [8, 9] to be equivalent (through the isomorphism :
This equivalence triggered a strong controversy (see [3, 10] ) between Atanassov and his followers, which thought AFS were a valid B2 model (or at least a valid intuitionistic model) different from IVFS, and an important part of the fuzzy community, which instead thought the intuitionistic meaning of AFS was not clear at all and, since IVFS were formulated some years before than AFS, the relevance of the latter as bipolar objects should be reduced due to such equivalence (despite IVFS were originally conceived as B1 objects).
In our opinion, AFS' original semantics (whatever it may be) is not of B2 type, and therefore AFS are not a really relevant landmark in the field of bipolarity. However, if ν is interpreted as the membership function of a polarity Q such that Q P ≠ ¬ , i.e. μ ν + ≤ is maintained, then a B2 semantics (with a particular relation between poles P and Q) is easily obtained, and our opinion is that these objects (which will be referred to as bipolar AFS: BAFS) are not semantically equivalent to IVFS. In order to support this last claim, we will formally define the semantics of B2 logical objects, and will show that semantics of BAFS (and in general that of F1 and B2 formalisms) is different from that of IVFS (in general, from that of B1 and F2 models). Such a semantical differentiation will be introduced through the notion of four-valued extension.
Four-valued extensions
Given an evidence couple ( , ) indicates that x has a fully positive character, and thus the positive truth of " " x P ∈ can be assumed in this case to be maximum, i.e., 1. This could lead to think that t coincides with the truth of " "
However, the pairs (1,1) or (0,0) do not represent neither a prevalence of the positive pole over the negative one nor the reciprocal. Rather, they make it clear that in a B2 context, the truth of " " x P ∈ could be partially compatible with more than one of the epistemic states t, f, i, k described in last section. Therefore, these states are also gradable or fuzzy in nature, and the notion of 4-valued extension is useful to quantify these compatibilities (and thus the semantics of the evidence couple) under some reasonable assumptions (as in preference modelling [14] , where the 4 values of the preference structure are the relevant, final items of the analysis). (1)- (2) was first proposed for the case L= [0, 1] in [29] (and have been further analyzed in [36] ), in which it is proven that it is the unique continuous t-norm-based extension simultaneously verifying that the states i and k are mutually exclusive (since if i>0 then k=0
and vice versa) and t f i k + + + 1 = . Notice that by exchanging the places of the Lukasiewicz t-norm e and the minimum t-norm ∧ , a different extension is obtained (and in fact it is used in preference modelling, see [14] ), in which the last equality also holds but now t and f are exclusive. Nevertheless, as we shall see, this last extension does not generalize classical truth and falsehood in the case in which Q P = ¬ , while that given by (1)- (2) does.
Before we apply this extension to the different combinations of fuzziness and bipolarity types, we enunciate the following theorem, that states the properties verified by such an extension for the case 
be the positive and negative interval-valued evaluations of a predi- 
are the uncertainty degrees of each interval. 
On the other hand, 
and since Thus, the extension (4)- (5) 
5)
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Type-1 fuzziness and type-2 bipolarity (F1,B2)
If negative information about " " x P ∈ is allowed to be independent from the negation n in the first case (F1,B1), then we obtain a B2 framework in which Q P ≠ ¬ , However, BAFS allows μ − to be independent from μ + since they exhibit a type-2 bipolarity, though the condition 1 μ μ + − + ≤ entails that k=0. Thus, it is clear that semantics of BAFS is different from that of IVFS, and their equivalence should be regarded as a formal coincidence between two scales that belong to different universes, Atanassov IVFS (AIVFS, see [2] ), though the same argument of Section 3 applies in order to affirm that they can not be seen as B2 objects unless it is assumed the existence of a negative pole Q P ≠ ¬ (leading to bipolar AIVFS).
Conclusions
The notions of fuzziness and bipolarity have been revised, and its relations analyzed. As these notions were developed to address different kinds of uncertainty, respectively linguistic imprecision and information relevance and polarity, both of them are in fact complementary and independent. An F2 object could be B2 or not, and reciprocally a B2 formalism could allow uncertainty (thus being also a F2 object) or not. Particularly, in this paper these differences have become formally evident, clarifying some aspects of the relations between B1,F2 formalisms and B2,F1 ones, and hopefully allowing to lead to an at least relative solution over the controversy between Atanassov's supporters and critics. As this paper implicitly shows, there is a difference between intuitionism (in the sense of using a sub-additive negation ( ) 1 n μ μ ≤ − ) and bipolarity. However, if Q P ≠ ¬ is assumed, then BAFS and BAIVFS have been shown to be relevant B2 objects. Table 1 presents a summary of the cases and formalisms analyzed in this paper, which have been shown to exhibit a different semantics in terms of fourvalued extensions, and thus in terms of its ability to model knowledge states. Further work is forthcoming in order to extend this work in several directions: lattices (see [5] and notice that all formalisms in Table 1 are special cases of L-fuzzy sets [16] ) will be introduced in order to obtain a more rigorous and general logical and formal setting. The relations between the notions of bipolarity and intuitionism, the use of a sub-additive negation and dissimilarity operators [31] will be further explored (see [15] ), as well as the possible use of a F2 formalism in order to combine fuzziness and other types of uncertainty theories.
